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Although the invariance criterion of logicality first emerged as a criterion of a largely
mathematical interest (Mostowski 1957, Lindström 1966, Tarski 1966), it has developed into a
criterion of considerable philosophical significance. As a philosophical criterion, invariance has
been studied and developed from several perspectives. Two of these are the natural-language
perspective and the theoretical-foundational perspective, centered on logic’s role in knowledge.
My own work (Sher 1991 to 2016) has focused on the second perspective. I have argued that the
invariance criterion of logicality makes important contributions to the development of a
theoretical foundation for logic focused on its contribution to knowledge – a dual, normative-
descriptive foundation centered on (i) the veridicality of logic and (ii) its strong modal force.
Those who focus on the natural-language perspective concentrate on the descriptive adequacy of
this criterion for the study of natural language. Here we have on the one hand philosophers and
linguists who study the criterion’s contributions to linguistic semantics (see Peters & Westerståhl
2006 and references there). On the other hand, there are critics of the criterion who base their
criticisms on its purported linguistic and intuitive inadequacy (see, e.g., Hanson 1997, Gómez-
Torrente 2002,  McFarlane 2005/2015, and Woods 2016). Thus, Woods opens his nuanced
criticism by saying: 
I argue that in order to apply the most common type of criteria for logicality,
invariance criteria, to natural language, we need to [require] both invariance of
content ... and invariance of character ... . If we do not require this, then old
objections ... suitably modified, demonstrate that content invariant expressions
can display intuitive marks of non-logicality. [2016: 778, my emphases]  
________________________
* I would like to thank the participants in the conference “Model Theory: Philosophy,
Mathematics, and Language” (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU, 2017), and in
particular Gil Sagi and Jack Woods for very helpful comments.
2These critics commonly focus on natural-language inferences whose logical validity is allegedly
sanctioned by the invariance criterion but challenged by speakers’ intuitions (either raw or
theory-laden intuitions). Some criticisms are directed at the prevalent version of the invariance
criterion, while others are directed at the very idea of an invariance criterion. Still others are
directed at the more general idea of a precise, systematic criterion of, or necessary-and-sufficient
condition for, logicality, regardless of whether it involves invariance. Among the latter, some opt
for a purely pragmatist approach to logicality. 
Naturally, there is room for misunderstandings between philosophers who evaluate the
invariance criterion of logicality on different grounds and from different perspectives. In
particular, there is room for misunderstandings between (i) those who evaluate this criterion on
theoretical grounds and those who evaluate it on intuitive grounds, and (ii) those who evaluate it
from the point of view of its contribution to a philosophical foundation of logic focused on
logic’s veridicality and role in knowledge and those who evaluate it from the point of view of its
descriptive adequacy with regard to natural language. In this paper I will try to remove a few
misunderstandings concerning the theoretical-foundational perspective on the invariance
criterion of logicality. To avoid repetition, I will focus on certain aspects of invariance that I have
not expanded on in the past as well as on certain points concerning the theoretical approach to
invariance and logicality that have led to misunderstandings. I hope that the clarification of these
points will help alleviate the tensions between the theoretical-foundational approach to logicality
and the natural-linguistic approach. 
1. The General Idea of Invariance
Invariance in general is a relation of the form “X is invariant under all variations Y”
(where “variations” can be understood as “changes”, “transformations”, “replacements”, and
similar expressions, and “Y” can be read as “in Y”, “of Y”,“of type Y”, “of type Y in Z”, etc.).
Invariance, in this general sense, is a very fruitful notion. Three examples (on different levels) of
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(1) A sentence is logically true iff (if and only if) its truth is invariant (preserved) under all
replacements of one model by another.  
(2)  The different geometries can be characterized in terms of the transformations of space  
under which their concepts are invariant.
(3) The laws of physics are invariant under all changes of inertial frames of reference. 
The first example is a reformulation of the standard semantic (model-theoretic) definition of
logical truth. Spelled out in more detail, it says that a sentence is logically true iff it is true (in
the/a model representing the actual world or even just true in some model) and its truth is
preserved under all variations in models (replacements of any model by another). The second
example is based on Klein’s 1872 Erlangen program of classifying geometries and explaining the
relations between them in terms of the transformations of space under which their characteristic
notions are invariant. Thus, the notions of “rigid-body” geometry are invariant under all
transformations of space that preserve distance between points, while the notions of Euclidean
geometry are invariant under all transformations of space that preserve ratios of distance between
points. Since the latter condition involves invariance under more transformations than the former,
Euclidean geometry is more general than rigid-body geometry. One of the most general
geometries is topology, whose notions are invariant under all transformations that preserve
1 2closeness (open sets). And in principle, geometry G  is more general than geometry G  iff the
1 2notions of G  are invariant under more transformations of space than the notions of G . The third
example is taken from special relativity, whose laws are invariant under all variations in inertial
frames of reference.
What does invariance mean? What is its significance? What does it amount to? We may
say that when X is invariant under all variations Y, X “does not notice”, “does not pay attention
to”, “is blind to” changes in Y, “is immune” to changes of type Y, or “is not affected” by changes
in Y and “cannot be undermined” by discoveries concerning features that vary from one Y to
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some relevant sense of “possible”), then we may say that logical truths “do not pay attention” to
whether the world is as portrayed by one model or by any other. In a similar way, the property of
being a Euclidean triangle “is blind” to transformations of space that change distances between
points so long that they preserve ratios of distances. (The image of any Euclidean triangle under
such transformations is also a Euclidean triangle.) The laws of physics “are immune to changes”
in inertial frames, or “are not affected” (“cannot be undermined”) by discoveries concerning the
distinctive features of given inertial frameworks, those that vary from one inertial framework to
another. And so on.
Accordingly, one of the ways in which invariance is highly significant is that the stronger
the invariance conditions a given notion satisfies (or the characteristic notions of a given field
satisfy), the stronger or more stable the notion (field of knowledge) is, in relevant respects.
1“Stronger”, in the cases we consider here, can be characterized as follows: Invariance condition I
2 1is stronger than invariance condition I  if the class of transformations associated with I  properly
2includes the class of transformations associated with I . But if the stronger the invariance
conditions satisfied by X, the stronger (in relevant respects) X is, then it is to be expected that if
X satisfies especially strong invariance conditions, X is especially strong (in relevant respects). It
would thus not be surprising if we could explain the fact that, and the way in which, logical
truths and consequences are stronger than other truths and consequences based on their strong
invariance. And as we shall see below, it is indeed possible to explain the exceptional modal
force of logical truths and consequences based on the fact that they, and/or some of their
constituents, satisfy certain especially strong invariance conditions. 
2. The Theoretical  Challenges of Logicality and Veridicality    
I. The Logicality Challenge 
The logicality challenge is the challenge of establishing the theoretical viability of a
5system of genuine logical consequences and explaining how it might be structured. Philosophers
may have less and more demanding conceptions of genuine logical consequence. Here I am
interested in a relatively demanding conception, associated with logic’s role in knowledge. This
role, as I understand it, is to devise a powerful, universal method or system for extending
knowledge in any field by moving us from truths & robust, correspondence-like truths & that we
may already know to truths (of the same kind) that we may not yet know. In this spirit, I require
that a genuine logical consequence satisfy the following strong conditions: 
(T)  A logical consequence transmits truth from premises to conclusion (where truth is
       a demanding notion: correspondence in a broad yet robust sense, rather than 
       mere coherence, pragmatic justification, disquotation, etc.).1
(M) The transmission of truth is guaranteed with an especially strong modal force. 
II. The Veridicality Challenge
 The veridicality challenge is the challenge of truth and justification of the logical theory
(system) itself. To be adequate, a logical theory has to say true things about logical truths and
consequences. It should not say that a sentence S follows logically from a set of sentences Ã
unless S in fact follows logically from Ã, i.e., unless the sentences of Ã in fact transmit
correspondence-truth – truth in the world – to S and do so with an especially strong modal force.
It is not sufficient that our intuitions tell us, or give us the impression, that this is the case; this
has to be the case, and we need to theoretically justify the claim that it is the case. 
Now, ideally, there would be no need to treat the veridicality challenge as a separate
 (i) I understand “disquotational truth” in this paper as exemplifying the view that truth1
in general takes into account only facts (such as disquotation) concerning language. I understand
“robust” as involving demanding requirements concerning the world (generally, the extra-
linguistic world).     
(ii) In this broad sense, correspondence is free from its traditional association with the
naive and simplistic idea of copy, mirror-image, or direct isomorphism. For further explanation
of this broad (yet robust) conception of correspondence see, e.g., Sher (2016).  
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the logicality challenge produces consequences that truly or in fact transmit truth from premises
to conclusion with an especially strong modal force. But in contemporary philosophy, as we have
noted above, philosophers sometimes focus on intuitive rather than theoretical justification.  So it2
is important to indicate that this is not sufficient. An adequate account of logicality must show
that the requisite conditions on logical consequence are in fact satisfied, and this “showing” must
be theoretical rather than merely intuitive in the everyday sense of the word.
The critical question concerning the invariance criterion of logicality, as a theoretical-
foundational criterion, is, then, whether it enables us to establish, theoretically, the viability of a
system of consequences that affirms all and only patterns of consequence that in fact transmit
truth from premises to conclusions with an especially strong type of necessity.   
3. Preliminaries
I. Methodology. The challenges of logicality and veridicality are foundational challenges,
challenges that have to do with fundamental philosophical questions concerning logic. But the
attempt to deal systematically with such foundational questions raises methodological problems
that have to be treated with care. Traditionally, philosophers assumed that the only methodology
for dealing with foundational questions is the foundationalist methodology. But the
foundationalist methodology makes a theoretical foundation of logic impossible. I have discussed
some of the problems it raises and proposed an alternative methodology elsewhere (Sher 2013,
2016), so here I will be very brief. One problem with the foundationalist methodology is its
requirement that in giving a foundation for a field of knowledge K we limit our epistemic
 For example, Hanson rejects “modal and formal accounts” of logicality on the ground2
that they “fail to satisfy our intuitions about logical consequence” (1997: 386, my emphasis). He
denies the logicality of a term alleged to be logical by the invariance account on the ground that
“it seems bizarre”, i.e., counter-intuitive, “to treat” it as logical (ibid.: 392, my emphasis). And
so on.  
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foundationalist hierarchy). But no basic field of knowledge can be given a theoretical foundation
under these conditions. Since logic is classified by foundationalists as a basic field, this problem
applies to logic. In the literature, many philosophers focus on a particular aspect of this problem:
due to the basicness of logic, we cannot provide a theoretical foundation for it without circularity
or infinite regress. Since all forms of circularity and infinite regress violate the foundationalist
strictures, we cannot provide a theoretical foundation for logic at all. 
To investigate logicality theoretically, therefore, we need a different methodology. The
methodology I will use here is a holistic methodology of a special kind, called “foundational
holism” (see Sher 2016). This methodology is holistic rather than foundationalist, but it differs
from various other types of holism in being geared toward foundational studies. Thus, this
holistic methodology is world oriented rather than coherentist, it emphasizes the inner
complexity of structures rather than totalities or wholes, and so on. Its holistic nature is reflected
in its attentiveness to large and open-ended networks of connections between diverse elements. It
recognizes that there are many ways to reach the world cognitively, both on the level of discovery
and on the level of justification. In particular, both discovery and justification may exhibit
multiple patterns, some hierarchical, others not. Accordingly, not all forms of circularity are
forbidden: some occurrences of circularity are innocuous, and some are even constructive. The
paradigmatic metaphor of foundational holism is Neurath’s Boat. In trying to meet the logicality
challenge we go back and forth between various kinds of considerations on various levels, using
whatever resources are available to us at the moment. 
II. Philosophical Theory and Mathematical Background-Theory. In studying logicality
theoretically from a philosophical point of view we are faced with a special problem. On the one
hand, we aim at a philosophical rather than a mathematical account, and in particular, we wish to
avoid commitment to any particular mathematical background-theory. On the other hand, using
the resources of some mathematical background-theory may have considerable benefits:
8expressing philosophical ideas using precise terms-of-art, bringing clear examples and counter-
examples, answering questions that are difficult to answer without mathematical resources, and
so on. The usefulness of a mathematical background-theory is especially significant in the
philosophies of logic and mathematics, due to the formality of the disciplines they study. But
using a specific mathematical theory as a background theory might introduce complications.
Whereas our philosophical ideas are devoid of problematic mathematical commitments, using the
resources of a specific mathematical theory to express them can easily create the false impression
that they do carry such commitments. To avoid such false impressions, I prefer to divide my
discussion of logicality into two parts. In Sher (2016) I started by formulating and explaining my
ideas philosophically, without using mathematical terms-of-art. Once this account was
completed, I presented a precisified version of the account, helping myself to the resources of a
specific mathematical theory, ZFC. Throughout the discussion I stressed that in principle one
could use a different mathematical background-theory, with different mathematical
commitments, so ZFC’s commitments are not inherent in the account. 
Due to limitations of space I will not be able to be as thorough in separating the two
accounts here. But to avoid misunderstandings, it is important to be aware of this point. In
particular, it is important to realize that the explanation of invariance and logicality given in the
present paper is philosophical rather than set-theoretical. It is not committed to ZFC; nor does it
carry its commitments.
4. Two Invariance Principles of Logicality. 
In the philosophical literature on logicality, talk of invariance is usually directed at one
use of invariance – demarcation of logical constants – and accordingly, at one type of invariance.
But in fact, there is another use, and another type, of invariance in logical semantics as well. This
invariance principle appears as my first example of general invariance above. It concerns the use
of models for demarcating logical truths and consequences. I will call it “the first invariance
9principle of logicality”, or “the model-theoretic invariance principle” (I-M). 
I. The First Invariance Principle of Logicality: Invariance under (changes in) models (I-M) 
The first invariance principle of logicality underlies the standard semantic definition of
logical consequence, whose roots go back to Tarski (1936). Consider a collection Ã of sentences
of a given language L and a sentence S of L. The standard semantic definition of logical
consequence can be formulated as:
(LC) S is a logical consequence of Ã (in L) iff in every model (for L) in which all the sentences
of Ã are true S is also true,
 
without commitment to a specific mathematical construal of models. To capture the requirement
that the truth in question is of a robust kind, i.e., a broadly correspondence-truth, we can
reformulate LC as:
(LC’) S is a logical consequence of Ã (in L) iff in every model (for L) in which all the sentences
of Ã are correspondence-true S is also correspondence-true.
Now, although people rarely think of LC as a definition of logical consequence in terms of
invariance, the idea of invariance (the same idea as in Section 1 above) is implicit in it. We can
make this idea explicit by reformulating LC as Invariance-under-Models, I-M:
(I-M) S is a logical consequence of Ã iff  the transmission of (correspondence-) truth from
Ã to S is invariant under all variations in (replacements of) models,
Three questions concerning LC, or its reformulation, I-M, concern language, models, and
logical constants:   
(a) Language. What kind of language is assumed by LC/I-M? Since we are interested in a
theoretical account of logicality, we need to think of this language, which we may identify with L
above, as a theoretical language, rather than as a natural language. As a theoretical language, L
abstracts from those features of language in general that are deemed irrelevant for understanding
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logicality.  3
(b) Models. How shall we understand models, philosophically? To capture the conception
of logical consequence as transmitting correspondence-truth from sentences to sentences with an
especially strong modal force, models have to satisfy certain conditions: (i) models should
represent all and only ways the actual world could have been, given a relevant understanding of
possibility,  (ii) there should be a model that represents the way the world actually is in relevant4
respects,  and (iii) the totality of models should be especially large, i.e., the conception of5
possibility involved should be especially broad, broader than that of physical and even
metaphysical possibility. By focusing on the world & the way it is and the ways it could have
been & (i) and (ii) ensure that logical consequence transmits the right kind of truth, namely
correspondence-truth (truth-in-the-world), and that the transmission of truth occurs in all relevant
situations, actual and counterfactual. (iii) ensures that logical consequences have an especially
strong modal force, i.e., the modal force of logic is greater than that of physics and even
metaphysics. What the relevant conception of possibility is will become clear shortly. 
(c) Logical Constants. To achieve transmission of truth and exceptional modal force,
logical consequence is dependent on a special feature of sentences. This feature is commonly
called “logical form”, but in fact it could also be called “logical content”. Logical consequence
takes into account only the logical form or content of the sentences involved, not their non-
logical form/content. The logical form/content of sentences has to do with the identity and
 In principle, L can be either an extensional or an intensional language. But for reasons3
explained in Sher (1991), the logical constants of L are extensional.
 As we will see below, however, my conception of models as representational is subject4
to constraints that distinguish it from the “representational” conception discussed, and rightly
rejected, by Etchemendy (1990). For a more detailed explanation, see Sher (1996). 
 Some philosophers (e.g., Field 2009) argue that models based on standard set theory as a5
background theory are incapable of adequately representing the actual world. Whether they are
right or wrong, the fact that our conception of models is not tied up to this particular background
theory (or, indeed, to any other) exempts it from this argument.   
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distribution of constants of a certain kind: constants that, due to their special character, support
especially strong and universal consequences. Logical consequence holds fixed the content or
denotation of these constants while treating the content or denotation of the non-logical constants
as variable (in effect, treating these constants as schematic letters or variables). When it comes to
models, logical constants have a fixed denotation (content, satisfaction conditions) in all models,
while the denotation (content, satisfaction conditions) of the non-logical constants varies (vary)
from model to model.  6
Given the conditions T (transmission of truth) and M (especially strong modal force) on
logical consequence, it is crucial that we set specific requirements on admissible logical
constants. This was already noted by Tarski (1936). If, for example, we treat the material
conditional as a non-logical constant, changing its denotation from model to model, Modus
Ponens will come out logically invalid. And if we treat “Tarski”, “Frege”, and “is a logician” as
logical constants, “Tarski is a logician; therefore, Frege is a logician” will come out logically
valid. Tarski himself did not arrive at any principled criterion for (characterization of,
requirements on) logical constants in his 1936 paper, “consider[ing] it quite possible that
investigations will bring no positive results in this direction” (ibid.: 420). From the present
perspective, the challenge is to find a criterion for logical constants that satisfies, and perhaps
even maximizes the satisfaction of, the two conditions on logical consequence, T and M.
These considerations leave the theoretical philosopher of logic with three major tasks:   
(A) Construct a theoretical criterion for logical constants. 
 (i) See Sher (1991). This amounts to another important constraint on models. 6
(ii) As explained in Sher (ibid.), the fixity of logical constants does not mean that they
have the same extension in all models (the extension of the universal quantifier in a model with 8
individuals is a set of 8 individuals, while its extension in a model with 9 individuals is a set of 9
individuals). What it means that their extension is determined for all models in advance, by a
fixed principle. (In the case of the universal quantifier, this principle says that its extension in any
model is the whole domain of that model). 
(iii) For an interesting discussion of the fixity of logical constants in the context of
current model theory (the current mathematical theory of models), see Sagi (2018).
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(B) Specify a type of possibility suitable for logical consequence (and underlying the
      totality of models). 
(C) Explain how (A) and (B) satisfy T and M. 
    
In other words, the theoretical philosopher’s task is find, or develop, a theoretical criterion for (or
characterization of) logical constants and identify a type of possibility that, together, render LC/I-
M an adequate criterion of logical consequence. This brings us to the second invariance principle
of logicality and the discussion of formal possibility.
II. The Second Invariance Principle of Logicality: Invariance under isomorphisms (I-I) 
The second invariance principle of logicality is a criterion for logical constants. This
criterion is often referred to as the “invariance under isomorphisms” criterion (I-I).7
The Invariance-under-Isomorphisms criterion for logical constants (I-I) that I will discuss
here is the criterion developed in Sher (1991) based on earlier mathematical criteria due to
Mostowski (1957) and Lindström (1966).  I-I has two parts, an objectual part and a linguistic8
part. The latter concerns the constants of the language L, the former & their objectual denotations,
and more generally, objects (in particular, extra-linguistic objects). 
A. Objectual Part of I-I. The objectual part of I-I applies to objects of a certain kind. One
can think of these objects in various ways. Given the present goal, I prefer to think of the relevant
objects as properties, where properties include proper properties, relations, and functions of any
 It is also often referred to as the “invariance under bijections” criterion and the “Tarski-7
Sher thesis”. A related criterion is the invariance-under-automorphisms/permutations criterion
(Mostowski 1957, Tarski 1966), but depending how one understands it, this criterion is
significantly different from, and inferior to, the invariance-under-isomorphisms/bijections
criterion. See McGee (1996) and Sher (1991, 2016). 
 The 1991 criterion was developed in the mid-80's, before Tarski’s 1966 lecture was8
published. But it can also be construed as a development of the criterion proposed by Tarski.
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level and any arity.  I-I divides properties into two types: those that do and those they do not9
satisfy it. Adherents of I-I regard the former as admissible denotations of logical constants, the
latter as inadmissible. The formulations of I-I by Mostowski, Lindström, and Tarski are limited
to its objectual part.   
B. Linguistic Part of I-I.  The linguistic part of I-I does two things: 10
(a) It tells us that a logical constant must denote a property that satisfies the objectual part
     of I-I. 
(b) It sets additional conditions on logical constants, intended to ensure that logical
      constants satisfying (a) are adequately integrated into a syntactic-semantic system of
                  logical consequence incorporating LC/I-M. 
In this paper I will focus on the objectual part of I-I. (For the linguistic entries of I-I see Sher
1991.) In accordance with my second preliminary comment in Section 3, I will offer two versions
of I-I: one that is not and one that is couched in a mathematical background-theory. I will call the
non-mathematical version of the criterion “Invariance under 1-1 replacements of individuals”,
and I will use the abbreviation “I-R” for this version. I-R is intended to be understood in a way
that does not involve specific mathematical (including set-theoretical) commitments. Depending
on context, “I-I” will name either the mathematical version of the criterion or the broader
conception (I-R). 
The non-specifically-mathematical version of I-I, invariance-under-replacements-of-
individuals, or I-R, can be presented as follows:  
(I-R) An n-place property, -, of level m, is invariant under all 1-1 replacements of individuals
iff for any domain of individuals, D, and any argument, â, of - (in D), â has the property
 I think of objects in general as divided into individuals (objects of level 0) and9
properties (objects of level >0). The use of properties in the present discussion does not assume
any specific theory of properties, and various theories of properties are compatible with this
account. For the purpose of the present discussion we can for the most part disregard current
controversies concerning properties. 
 “Linguistic”, here, is a theoretical adjective applicable to languages in the sense of10
Section 4(I)(a) above.   
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- (in D) iff the image of â under any 1-1 replacement ú of the individuals in D has the
property - (in D’, the image of D under ú).11
Consider the 2-place 1st-level property x-loves-y.  It is quite clear that this property does12
not satisfy I-R. But the 2-place 1st level property x=y does satisfy I-R. Consider the 1-place 2nd-
level property P-IS-A-PROPERTY-OF-HUMANS, where P is a 1-place 1st-level property. This
property does not satisfy I-R, but the 1-place 2nd-level property P-IS-NON-EMPTY – the
existential-quantifier property – does. 
The mathematical version of I-R, (I-I below) is thought of as a precisification of I-R:
(I-I) An n-place property, -, of level m, is invariant under all isomorphisms iff for any
domains D, D’ and any arguments â, â’ of - in D,D’ respectively: if <D,â> is isomorphic
to <D’,â’>, then â has the property - (in D) iff â’ has - (in D’).13
As noted above, various variants of (I-I) can be introduced using various background
mathematical theories. One version of I-I will use ZFC as its background theory,  another may14
use Russell’s theory of types as background theory,  and still others may have other15
mathematical background theories. 
Although in the historical order of discovery I-I was prior to I-R, in the order of
 (i) D is any collection of individuals, actual or counterfactual. Since I-R is not11
formulated in any specific mathematical background theory, D does not have to be identified as a
set, a proper class, or an entity of any other specific mathematical type. For the sake of simplicity
we assume that D is non-empty. 
  (ii) Given a - and a D: If - is a 1-place 1st-level property, its arguments in D are
individuals in D. If - is a 2-place 1st-level property, its arguments in D are pairs of individuals in
D. And so on. If - is a 1-place 2nd-level property of 1-place properties, its arguments in D are 1-
place 1st-level properties whose arguments in D are individuals in D). And so on.
 I use italics for 1st-level properties and small capital letters for 2nd-level properties. 12
 <D,â> is isomorphic to <D’,â’> iff there is a bijection f from D to D’ such that â’ is the13
image of â under f.
 In this version, D, D’ will be proper sets.14
 In fact, Russellian type-theory was one of the two background theories used by Tarski15
for his 1966 version of I-I.
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philosophical explanation and justification I-R is prior to I-I. This calls for a methodological
clarification: My goal in this paper is to explain how the foundational theorist approaches the
question of logicality and how invariance enters into her eventual account. To that end, the
explanation I provide has the character of a rational reconstruction (in a quasi-Carnapian sense).
It does not seek to trace the history of the invariance criterion; instead it explains how it is
rational to reconstruct it.
I-I as presented so far is, strictly speaking, a criterion for properties and predicates
(including quantifiers). What about sentential operators and connectives? I-I can be generalized
to an invariance criterion of logicality for such operators/connectives in several ways. If we
assume bivalence, the sentential version of I-I (given in Sher 1991, 2016) coincides with the
usual truth-functionality criterion for logical connectives. For the purpose of the present
discussion, however, it is sufficient to focus on I-I as a criterion for properties/predicates. 
We are now ready to explain why the Invariance-under-Isomorphisms criterion is an
appropriate criterion for logical constants and to specify the type of possibility that must be
represented by models – the models used in logic, which I will call “logical models”. This will
enable us to explain how the two invariance conditions, I-M (invariance under models, or LC)
and I-I, satisfy the two conditions on an adequate notion (system, method) of logical consequence
& T (transmission of correspondence-truth) and M (especially strong modal force). 
5. Invariance-under-Isomorphisms, Formality, and Modal Force
One of the distinctive characteristics of the invariance-under-isomorphism criterion & a
characteristic that distinguishes it from other criteria for, and accounts of, logical constants  & is16
that it captures a certain especially fruitful philosophical idea. This idea is formality. Not
formality in the traditional syntactic sense, or the schematic semantic sense, or the substitutional
 From Feferman’s (1999, 2010) invariance-under-homomorphisms criterion to16
pragmatist, non-invariance accounts (see below).
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semantic sense, but formality in an objectual semantic sense. Objects & specifically properties &
satisfying I-I are formal in this sense; objects that do not satisfy I-I are not formal (in this sense).
Any constant can be formal in the syntactic, schematic, or substitutional sense, i.e., be treated as
a fixed, distinguished element, partaking in the “form” of sentences (see, e.g., Etchemendy
1990). But only constants that denote properties satisfying I-I are formal in a sense that is
relevant to the two conditions on logical consequence noted above, T (transmission of
correspondence-truth) and M (especially strong modal force). 
I-I is connected to formality both extensionally and intensionally. Extensionally,
properties satisfying I-I are mathematical and all mathematical objects & individuals, properties,
and structures & either satisfy I-I or are systematically correlated with properties that satisfy I-I.
Among the mathematical properties that satisfy I-I are identity, the 2nd-level Boolean properties
corresponding to the standard logical connectives, the existential- and universal-quantifier
properties (NON-EMPTINESS, UNIVERSALITY), ONE, TWO, ..., FINITELY MANY, INFINITELY MANY, IS-
REFLEXIVE/SYMMETRIC/ TRANSITIVE, IS-WELL-ORDERED, etc. Mathematical structures, such as the
structure of the natural numbers, are systematically correlated with quantifier-properties
satisfying I-I. Mathematical individuals such as the number 1 are correlated with 2nd-level
cardinality properties – ONE, ... – which satisfy I-I. The 1st-level 1-place property x-is-even
satisfies I-I when construed as a 3rd-level property of 2nd-level cardinality properties, and so on.
In contrast, all paradigmatic non-mathematical objects and properties (such as Archimedes, is-red
and IS-A-PROPERTY-OF-HUMANS) do not satisfy I-I.17
Intensionally, I-I captures the idea of formality as strong structurality. Take any property
- of any level, any domain D, and any argument â of - in D. Now take the pair <D,â> and take
any pair <D’,â’> that has the exactly the same structure as <D,â>. Such a structure can be
obtained from <D,â> by a 1-1 replacement of the individuals of D, and if it does, then â satisfies
 To apply I-I to Archimedes, we identify Archimedes with a property, such as is-17
Archimedes. Clearly, this property does not satisfy I-I.
17
- in D iff â’ satisfies - in D’. I.e., - satisfies I-I iff it pays attention only to highly structural
features of its arguments, iff it is blind to all features of its arguments but (some of) their highly
structural features. Speaking in terms of invariance, we may say that most properties abstract
from some features of their arguments, and as such they satisfy some invariance condition and
have some degree of invariance. In this sense, they are at least weakly structural. But I-I is an
especially strong invariance condition. Paradigmatically biological, physical, and other properties
do not satisfy this condition; only highly-structural properties do. Such highly structural
properties are formal.
One ramification of I-I is that the transmission of truth from premises to conclusion by a
logical consequence is due to formal relations between the contents of its premises and the
content of its conclusion. Semantically, the transmission of truth is due to formal relations
between the truth conditions of it premises and conclusion. Objectually, the transmission of truth
is due to formal relations between the situations corresponding to its premises and conclusion, or
more precisely, between the formal structures of these situations. For example, the logical
consequence
(4) (x)(Ax wBx), ~(x)Ax; therefore: (x)Bx
is based on a relation between two formal structures: a structure of a non-empty union of two
properties, P1 and P2, the first of which, P1, is empty, and a structure in which the second
property, P2, is non-empty. This relation is itself formal, so (4) is based on a formal relation
between two formal structures, or on a formal relation between formal features of the situations
that make (or would make) the premises and conclusion of (4) true. It is due to this relation that
(4) transmits (correspondence-) truth from its premises to its conclusion.
Another ramification of I-I is that the transmission of truth from premises to conclusion
by a logical consequence has an especially strong modal force. This ramification arises from the
fact that the invariance associated with the properties denoted by logical constants – invariance
under isomorphisms – is connected to an especially strong type of necessity. The connection
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between invariance under isomorphisms and strong necessity is based on the fact that properties
invariant under all isomorphisms cannot distinguish between individuals of any kinds, actual or
counterfactual, and therefore the laws governing such properties cannot distinguish between
actual-counterfactual individuals of any kind either. Since the space of such actual-counterfactual
individuals is especially large (larger than the space of individuals that physical and even
metaphysical properties do not distinguish), the actual-counterfactual scope of the laws
governing them is especially large. In other words, these laws have an especially strong modal
force. Since logical consequences are grounded in such laws, they have an especially strong
modal force. This result has two parts: 1. Logical consequences are grounded in laws governing
the properties denoted by their logical constants, namely formal properties. 2. Since these
properties have an especially strong degree of invariance, their laws – formal laws – hold in an
especially large space of possibilities, hence have an especially strong modal force.
We can finally understand the notion of possibility represented by logical models: logical
models represent the totality of formal possibilities, namely, all the ways the world could have
been when only formal structure is taken into account. This is the reason invariance under all
replacements of models is an adequate criterion of logical consequence.  
We have seen how the two invariance criteria of logicality, invariance-under-
isomorphisms (I-I) and invariance under models (I-M) establish, theoretically, the viability of an
adequate system of logical consequence. Elsewhere (Sher 2016 and works mentioned there) I
showed that the formality of logical consequences (in the sense of I-I) also explains their other
properties: their considerable generality, topic neutrality, basicness, certainty, and normativity, as
well as their quasi-apriority.18
 Concerning generality, Bonnay (2008) interprets Tarski as saying that I-I is associated18
with utmost generality rather than with formality. But for reasons presented both in Bonnay
(ibid.) and in Sher (2008), I-I does not really capture the idea of utmost generality. It captures the
idea of formality which, in turn, is associated with considerable, yet not utmost, generality. For
discussion see op. cit.
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This theoretical account of logic employs the foundational holistic methodology. The
account is developed in a stage by stage (step by step) manner, going back and forth in a
Neurath-boat style. While in earlier stages we did not have sufficient resources for explaining the
relation between logical and metaphysical possibility, at this point we do. The degree of
invariance of metaphysical properties is smaller than that of formal properties. Hence the space
of logical/formal possibilities is greater than that of metaphysical possibilities. Consider the
metaphysical impossibility of being all-red and yellow at the same time. This impossibility is not
formal. The property of being both all-red and yellow is not invariant under all isomorphisms.
That is to say, the combination of being all red and yellow is not ruled out on formal grounds.
Formal possibility abstracts from most features of individuals, including color and color
relationships. Therefore, an individual that is both all red and yellow is formally possible and as
such belongs in the domain of some logical models. There are models that represent individuals
that are both all red and yellow, individuals that are both dead and alive, individuals that do not
satisfy the regularities of biology or the laws of physics or the principles of metaphysics. This is
the reason the scope of logical possibility is broader than that of other types of possibility and the
modal force of preserving truth in all (logical) models is exceptionally high.  19
Many of the alleged counter-examples to I-I neglect the difference between formal
possibility and other kinds of possibility, which is crucial for understanding the philosophical
significance of both the invariance-under-models criterion (I-M or LC) and the invariance-under-
 Regarding the comparison between logical and metaphysical necessity/possibility,19
however, it is important to note that metaphysics is a highly heterogeneous discipline, dealing, on
the one hand, with very basic ontological issues, such as what makes something an object, and on
the other hand, with less basic issues, such as causality, free will, observable vs. unobservable
objects, physical vs. mathematical objects, abstract vs. concrete objects, and so on, including
issues like color incompatibilities. These less basic (but still quite basic) issues occupy a much
larger space in contemporary metaphysics than the more basic ones, and my references to
metaphysics in this paper concern metaphysical possibilities and impossibilities of the less basic
kinds. (I leave the relation between logic and the most basic parts of metaphysics to another
paper.)
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isomorphisms criterion (I-I). These alleged counter-examples often assume an intuitive or a
metaphysical notion of possibility, which is weaker than the notion relevant for I-M and I-I.
Therefore, they are not genuine counter-examples. These examples are also usually presented as
natural-language examples. 
This brings us to the relation between the theoretical, philosophical-foundational,
perspective on logicality and the natural-linguistic perspective.
6. The Natural-Linguistic and Foundational Perspectives.
So far we have discussed the two invariance criteria of logicality & invariance-under-
models (I-M) and invariance-under-isomorphisms (I-I) & as criteria designed to satisfy theoretical
conditions on logical consequence: transmission of (correspondence-) truth (T) and especially
strong modal force (M). We have seen that, from this perspective, the combination of the two
invariance criteria, I-M and I-I, fares well: it ensures the satisfaction of T and M, thereby
establishing the viability, in principle, of an adequate system of logical consequence. How does
this combination, and in particular I-I, fare from a natural-linguistic perspective? Is I-I a
descriptively adequate criterion of logicality from this perspective?
To answer this question we need, first, to understand what it means. What,
exactly, does descriptive adequacy amount to in this case? How do we establish it in principle?
It is hard to find a detailed answer to these questions in the critical literature on I-I.
Two co-authors who do raise this question are Peters and Westerståhl (2006). Peters and
Westerståhl first formulate this question in a way that is similar to our theoretical question,
namely, by asking whether I-I is adequate for a genuine logical consequence. Next they ask
whether the method commonly used in empirical linguistics, namely, the method of consulting
speakers’ linguistic intuitions, is appropriate for answering this question. It is widely agreed that
this method is appropriate for determining grammaticality; the question is whether it is also
appropriate for determining validity and logicality. Peters and Westerståhl are skeptical about a
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positive answer to this question. While linguistic intuitions have been shown to be reliable with
respect to grammaticality, it is easy to see that they are unreliable in determining validity and
logicality. As a result, Peters and Westerståhl give up the attempt to solve the problem of
logicality from a natural-linguistic perspective. They take I-I to be a necessary condition on
logical constants in natural language, but they do not try to determine whether it is a sufficient
condition, i.e., whether it is an adequate criterion of logicality for natural language.
What they do investigate, instead, is whether the invariance-under-isomorphisms
criterion, I-I, enables us to better understand linguistic phenomena that are difficult to understand
without it. Their answer to this question is positive. They show that and explain how non-
standard logical quantifiers sanctioned by I-I enable us to explain phenomena concerning
determiners and complex quantifier-structures in natural language. For example, the non-
standard monadic logical operator MOST, sanctioned by I-I, explains the behavior of the
determiner “most” in sentences such as “Two critics reviewed most films”; the polyadic operator
MOST ... -AND-MOST ..., sanctioned by I-I, explains branching-quantifier structures in natural
language such as “Most of the boys in my class and most of the girls in your class have all dated
each other”; and so on.
Peters & Westerståhl’s approach is reasonable. On the one hand, studying the ways the
invariance-under-isomorphisms criterion, I-I, provides new resources for understanding linguistic
structures, both in natural language and in artificial languages, makes good sense. But relying on
speakers’ intuitions to determine validity and logicality does not. Validity and logicality are
significantly different from grammaticality, and employing the same method for both requires
careful justification. 
Most philosophers, however, do not heed Peters & Westerståhl’s warning about the use
of linguistic intuitions to determine logicality. Such intuitions are widely used by philosophers as
grounds for rejecting I-I without any attempt to justify the use of intuition as an arbiter in this
case. In addition, some opponents of I-I appeal to views whose relevance to logicality is
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questionable. Let me explain these points by reference to two alleged counter-examples to I-I due
to Gómez-Torrente (2002, 2003): “unicorn” and “male widow”.
Gómez-Torrente claims that the properties is-a-unicorn and is-a-male-widow are
empty “in all possible universes” (Ibid.: 2002, p. 18). As such, he says, they satisfy the
invariance-under-isomorphisms criterion, I-I. Accordingly, the linguistic expressions “is a
unicorn” and “is a male widow” come out logical. This, in turn, implies that “There are no
unicorns” and “There are no male widows” are logically true. But these sentences “are intuitively
not logically true” (Ibid,: 2003, p. 204). Hence, according to Gómez-Torrente, I-I is not an
adequate criterion of logicality.
I explained why this criticism is incorrect in Sher (2003). But there I focused on the fact
that the linguistic expressions “x is a unicorn” and “x is a male widow” do not satisfy the
extended, linguistic, version of I-I, spelled out in Sher (1991). Here I would like to focus on the
properties is-a-unicorn and is-a-male-widow. I would like to point out certain assumptions
underlying Gómez-Torrente’s use of these properties to criticize I-I and explain how these
assumptions lead us to think that these properties satisfy I-I when in fact they do not. Let me
begin with male widow.
Gómez-Torrente claims that male widow is empty in “all possible universes”. What is
the basis for this claim? My understanding is that this claim is based on our ordinary intuitions.
But this approach to the issue neglects the fact that the notion of possibility involved in both the
invariance-under-isomorphisms criterion (I-I) and the invariance-under-models criterion (I-M) is
a specific and especially broad notion of possibility, namely, the notion of formal possibility,
whereas the notion of possibility employed in the claim that male widow is empty in all possible
universes is a non-specific notion of possibility, one that is usually understood in a way that
makes it weaker than formal possibility. This explains why this example cannot be used to
undermine I-I. The incompatibility between being male and being a widow is not a formal
incompatibility. Therefore, it does not rule out the formal possibility of situations in which the
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property male-widow, like the property both-all-red-and-yellow, is not empty. Male-widow, then, 
does not satisfy I-I, and “There are no male widows” is not true in all logical models, hence does
not come out logically true on the invariance account of logicality incorporating I-I and I-M.
What about the property unicorn? Why would anyone think that this property is
empty in all possible universes? The claim that unicorn is empty in all possible universes is, if I
understand Gómez-Torrente correctly, based not on natural-linguistic intuitions but on a
particular philosophical theory that is naturally viewed as belonging to the philosophy of
language or to metaphysics, due to Kripke (1972/80). But this theory does not provide an
adequate ground for rejecting I-I. First, this theory is not a theory of formal possibility/necessity,
but a theory of metaphysical possibility/necessity, and as such it is irrelevant to I-I. Second, this
theory does not really say that unicorn is an empty property in all possible universes. It says that
unicorn, being a mythological-species “property”, is, like all other mythological species
“properties”, not a genuine property. I will not go into Kripke’s reasons for this claim here. But if
one accepts his claim, one cannot bring is-a-unicorn as a counter-example to I-I, since I-I does
not deal with non-properties. 
There are other linguistic/intuitive grounds on which some philosophers have tried to
deny I-I. For critical discussions of these grounds see, e.g., Paseau (2013), Sagi (2015), and Sher
(1991, 2003, 2016).
7. A Pragmatist Approach to Logicality.
A number of philosophers & e.g., Hanson (1997, 2002) and Gómez-Torrente (2002,
2003) & prefer a pragmatist approach to logicality over a theoretical approach. Two main
weaknesses of the pragmatist approach to logicality are: (i) its neglect of veridicality, and (ii) its
neglect of theoretical explanation. These, I believe, are pragmatism’s main weaknesses in all
theoretical branches of knowledge. If, and so long as, we view the search for knowledge as a
search for truth (in a robust, correspondence, sense), if we require veridical justification and
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evidence for theoretical claims, and if we aim at genuinely explanatory theories, then we cannot
be content with a pragmatist approach to knowledge. In the philosophy of logic, or those parts of
the philosophy of logic that are discussed in this paper, the question of truth arises in multiple
places and on multiple levels: What should logical consequence transmit from premises to
conclusion given its role in knowledge? Is a given claim of logical consequence true? (Does it in
fact transmit correspondence truth from premises to conclusion with an especially strong modal
force?) What is (are) the source(s) of truth of logical-consequence claims? Is it true that a system
of logic based on I-I and I-M satisfies the requirements of transmission of truth and modal force
on logical consequence? Does the formality of logic, articulated in terms of I-I, provide a
theoretical explanation of the special features of logic & necessity, generality, topic-neutrality,
etc.? And so on. All these are theoretical questions of truth and explanation that, in principle,
require veridical theoretical answers rather than pragmatic answers.
This is not to say, however, that pragmatic considerations cannot play any role in
theoretical knowledge. Where can pragmatic considerations enter into the invariantist account of
logicality? They can play a partial role in choosing the overall best background theories for the
account. (Such a choice is needed when, e.g., we have no decisive veridical basis for choosing
between two candidates for a background theory.) They can play a partial role in deciding which
logical system licensed by the invariantist account of logicality to choose in a particular context
or given a particular goal. (For example, it is pointless to choose a system that includes high-
infinite-cardinality quantifiers if our interest is limited to everyday inferences or even to
inferences in physics.) They may be used in deciding on certain details of our system of logical
consequence. (For example, the decision whether to limit models to structures with non-empty
universes.) And so on. But pragmatic considerations should be used alongside, and be balanced
by, considerations of veridicality and theoretical explanation, not in lieu of these.  
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8. Conclusion
Invariance plays a central role in many fields of knowledge. In logic, it plays a central role
in a theoretical foundational account of logicality, both on the level of logical constants and on
the level of logical consequence. Often, however, the invariance criteria of logicality, and in
particular I-I, have been evaluated from other perspectives, and this has led to disagreements
based on a misunderstanding of their designated role. In this paper I have tried to put some of
these disagreements in perspective. In particular, I have explained the foundational-theoretical
perspective on logicality as distinguished from the natural-linguistic intuitive perspective. 
The foundational-theoretical perspective starts with a conception of logic’s role in the
advancement of human knowledge, and proceeds to the requirement that logical consequences
transmit (correspondence) truth from sentences to sentences with an especially strong modal
force. It shows how the two invariance criteria of logicality, invariance-under-models and
invariance-under-isomorphisms, give rise to a logical system that grounds logical consequences
in a particular facet of the world, formal laws, which have the requisite modal force. A central
aspect of this account is the connection between invariance, formality, and modal force. Logical
constants represent formal properties, properties that have an especially high degree of invariance
and as such do not distinguish between most individuals (including metaphysically possible and
impossible individuals). Logical consequences are based on laws governing the relations between
such properties, laws that hold in all formally-possible situations, which are represented by the
totality of models. As such, their modal force is greater than the modal force of laws and
consequences of other disciplines, whose actual-counterfactual scope is narrower.   
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